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Volume 7, Number 18 (November 20, 2002) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Winners and losers  
The Moscow hostage drama is affecting the careers of several officials as well as 
their ministries.  
 
Boris Gryzlov's interior ministry (MVD) currently is on the cutting board with 
proposals for reorganization coming from within the ministry as well as from the 
FSB and apparently the president. While the proposed changes themselves are 
not new, since Gryzlov was brought onboard to direct the reorganization of the 
large and complex ministry, ripples from the hostage crisis can be detected. 
Police Major General Tatiana Moskalkova, deputy head of the interior ministry's 
Main Legal Department, has proposed dividing the organization into three entities 
along the lines of some European law enforcement agencies. Roughly speaking, 
they would take the form of a National Guard, a Federal and Municipal Police 
and an Internal Investigation Service. This proposal contrasts with an idea 
espoused earlier both by the FSB and the Security Council that envisages only 
extracting the most effective components of the ministry and creating an 
independent service dedicated to fighting organized crime and corruption.  
 
This move may be viewed as a result of the FSB's increasing influence in Putin's 
Russia at the expense of other previously powerful security ministries. Indeed, 
only one year ago the MVD lost its jurisdiction over the penitentiary 
establishment and the fire brigades. Moskalkova's proposal shows that the 
MVD's bureaucratic machinery is attempting to control the direction and rate of its 
decline. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 4 Nov 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
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Also significant are public calls for Gryzlov to resign in the wake of the hostage 
drama. The FSB's Nikolay Patrushev has become another focal point of public 
outrage, but only Gryzlov needs to lose sleep over such trifles. (ECHO MOSKVY 
NEWS AGENCY, 30 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) However, 
recent speculation has placed Gryzlov at the head of a very short list to become 
the next party leader of Putin's Duma faction United Russia. It is not clear 
whether the rumors emanate from the presidential apparat, or constitute an 
attempt by Gryzlov to diversify his political portfolio. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 
15 Nov 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
President Putin publicly thanked Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the YABLOKO 
party, for his loyalty earlier this month. Yavlinsky played a role in the hostage 
crisis by attempting negotiation and, more importantly, remaining silent afterward, 
as requested by Putin's administration. The media broadcast Putin's expression 
of appreciation on all channels, while a clear message was sent to other 
individuals who, in Putin's eyes, attempted to exploit their role during the hostage 
crisis. Such opportunism at the expense of the leadership will not be rewarded. 
Yavlinsky reportedly has been a contender for a high-profile government 
appointment, and his performance has served to fuel such speculation. Another 
individual who has been less modest about his negotiating role, Boris Nemtsov of 
the Union of Right Forces (SPS), has been ignored. However, this oversight may 
have been influenced by Nemtsov's association with the Yel'tsin-era oligarchs, 
and by Putin's desire to drive a wedge between the two democratic parties, SPS 
and YABLOKO. (MOSCOW NEWS, 6 Nov 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Earlier in his presidency, Putin had favored Nemtsov over Yavlinsky.  
 
Moreover, Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushailo (himself a former MVD 
chief) has announced a refinement of the security apparatus in the wake of the 
hostage crisis, with particular emphasis on counter-terrorism, stating that "this 
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work cannot be carried out without defining more clearly the priorities and 
dividing the functions between relevant departments within the country."  
 
Rushailo informed reporters that "the Office of the Russian Security Council, in 
line with Putin's instructions, has stepped up the work on the comprehensive 
analysis of fundamental changes and new threats that have appeared in the 
security sphere." This applies, he said, to "the existing blueprint of national 
security of the Russian Federation and the legislative acts regulating the 
activities of the law-enforcement bodies, the special services and the armed 
forces," which "no longer fully correspond to today's realities and to the main task 
of guaranteeing the safety of individuals, society and the state." (ITAR-TASS, 30 
Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Rushailo probably is alluding to the 
Ministry of Defense's assumption of a more active role in Russian counter-terror 
operations. This role was emphasized as the hostage crisis played out; 
apparently Anatoly Kvashnin, chief of the Russian General Staff (rather than the 
directors of the FSB and the MVD, as might be expected), provided Putin with 
significant inputs. This casts further light on Moscow's power politics; the identity 
of the persons to whom Putin listens casts light on who is (and who is not) a 
"player." (STRANA.RU WEBSITE, 30 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database)  
 
Those who were directly involved in the denouement of the hostage crisis do not 
appear to have gained (e.g., the FSB) or seem to be declining (i.e., the MVD). 
Meanwhile, individuals at the periphery of the crisis who have displayed proper 
deference to Putin (read Yavlinsky) are being rewarded. Others, such as the 
Ministry of Defense, seem to be reaping increased influence at the expense of 
other "power" organizations. The MVD, already on the decline, had little political 
capital to provide a buffer in the face of obvious failure. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
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By Michael Donahue 
 
FSB 
Toxic gas still obscures the truth 
Even on a conventional battlefield, gas dissipates with time, and as it lifts, 
commanders and observers can reach objective judgment concerning the 
effectiveness of their tactics and operations. Several weeks have passed since 
the violent resolution of the Moscow theater hostage crisis, however, and the 
truth of the event remains obscured by lingering doubts about the gas used in the 
assault and by the smoke screen put up by the presidential apparat and the 
security services to conceal nearly every facet of the operation. 
 
Rumors abound regarding the nature of the incapacitating gas used by the 
security forces that stormed the theater. Responsible for the deaths of at least 
120 hostages, possibly many more, Moscow's silence fueled domestic and 
international suspicion and criticism for nearly a week before it was announced 
that the gas was a fentanyl-based anesthetic of the kind commonly used in 
surgery. However, because such a substance normally requires direct inhalation 
in concentrated doses -- and pumping it into a theater predictably would dilute 
the effects -- some have surmised that a more sinister substance may have been 
used. After all, surgical anesthetic gases generally are neither lethal nor potent 
enough to massacre hundreds in a relatively well-ventilated space. One popular, 
if sensationalistic, source claimed that the substance actually was a nerve gas 
based on organophosphorous compounds, designed specifically to paralyze. 
(AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 4 Nov 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) If 
the FSB indeed possesses nerve gas, one can understand fully why Moscow 
would be tight-lipped -- such agents are banned internationally. Having killed 
almost three times as many hostages as terrorists and having captured only a 
couple of perpetrators, FSB director Nikolay Patrushev acknowledged his 
service's need for improvement, stating "we will have to correct our work." 
Indeed, that is putting it rather mildly. Perhaps the FSB leadership ought to be 
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the first item "corrected" -- one poll taken just days after the event showed that 
84% of respondents thought that both Patrushev and Interior Minister Gryzlov 
should be dismissed. (EKHO MOSKVY, 30 Oct 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
In other "successes," the FSB announced that it destroyed 69 illegal oil refineries 
and detained more than 20 highway tankers loaded with stolen petroleum in 
Chechnya last week. (ITAR-TASS, 7 Nov 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) This exceptionally planned and coordinated operation 
undoubtedly surpassed all FSB expectations -- the enemy (and its families) now 
have been effectively deprived of heating oil just in time for winter. A decisive 
victory in Moscow's war to win the hearts and minds of Chechens everywhere? 
 
Beyond Chechnya, the FSB has sensed an alarming growth in Islamic 
fundamentalism. Always concerned with the influence of Muslim schools in 
Russia's outlying regions, the security service has begun to focus on the spread 
of radical Islam and "Wahhabism" -- the particularly militant branch of Islamic 
education promoted through schools and directed at impressionable youth. 
Islamic schools in Russia have long been supported by foreign states, under the 
guise of raising religious awareness; however, the FSB has become concerned 
with the growth of such schools and the direction provided by Saudi Arabian and 
Pakistani clerics, among others. (NTV MIR, 1 Nov 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database)  
 
As poor as the FSB's counter-terrorism tactics appear to be, and given the real 
threat that radical Islamists pose to Russia and the world, it is high time for 
Moscow to focus on these schools. If the FSB does not reform internally, and 
quickly, it will never be able to cope with this particular threat -- unless of course 
it simply seals the school doors and "anesthetizes" those inside. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
Resolution 1441 and trouble on the horizon 
President Putin welcomed the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1441 on 8 November. He characterized it as an "acceptable 
compromise" and stated that all permanent members of the UNSC had 
contributed to its final version. (INTERFAX, 10 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1110, 
via World News Connection) On 14 November, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Yuri Fedorov told reporters that "The Russian leadership's decision [to vote for 
Resolution 1441] depended on the degree to which [Russian] concerns would be 
recognized." (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 15 Nov 02; via Lexis-Nexis) Despite 
Putin's often-repeated concern that the dispute be settled without the use of 
force, Russia's objection to previous versions of the resolution was the freedom 
of action they would have provided the United States and Britain.  
 
China and France allied with Russia to slow the UNSC process, thus helping 
Moscow to lay the groundwork for the future delays. These three permanent 
UNSC members issued a joint interpretation of the vague wording of Resolution 
1441. "In case of failure by Iraq to comply with its obligations... Such failure will 
be reported to the Security Council by the executive chairman of UNMOVIC 
[United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] or by the 
director general of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. It will be then 
for the council to take a position on the basis of that report." (THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES, 15 Nov 02; via Lexis-Nexis) France, China and Russia 
apparently interpret this as requiring that reports of problems experienced by the 
UN arms inspectors in Iraq be presented to the UNSC for APPROVAL. It is not 
likely that the three countries would approve military action resulting from a 
"material breach" of UNSC resolutions. In the words of Yuri Fedorov, "any 
difficulties in [the arms inspectors'] work should be reported to the Security 
Council, and its members are the only ones who should make decisions.... Any 
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actions bypassing the UN Security Council should be regarded as a violation of 
international law." (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 15 Nov 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
France, China and Russia each has its own reasons for opposing American 
action against Iraq. Certainly, all three would enjoy access to Iraqi markets in a 
post-sanctions era, although the existence of sanctions has not proven to be a 
hindrance to them thus far. They also attempt to counter American "hegemony." 
 
Russia's response to the recent North Korean nuclear crisis, however, reveals 
that the Kremlin's motives for apparently obstructionist behavior extend beyond 
mere economic gain. Despite the DPRK's admission that it has had a covert 
nuclear program for a number of years, Russia remains reluctant even to 
acknowledge the existence of such a program. In the words of Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov, Russia has "no documentary evidence 
about the existence of the nuclear program either from North Korea or from the 
United States." Losyukov followed that statement by recalling that the United 
States had accused North Korea of continuing its uranium-enrichment program in 
defiance of the framework agreement of 1994. In turn, he continued, Pyongyang 
has criticized the United States for failure to honor the agreement, in particular 
the deadlines for the construction of nuclear power plants in North Korea. 
Pyongyang argues that it has the right to possess not only nuclear, but other 
weapons of mass destruction. (ITAR-TASS, 5 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1105, via 
World News Connection) Just as Russia is denying the transfer of nuclear 
technology to Iran and attempting to obstruct actions against Iraq's arsenal of 
weapons of mass destruction, it seems poised to hamper any US reaction to 
North Korea's proliferation efforts. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Luba Schwartzman 
 
Stop the presses! 
No, the Putin administration does not have a hot news story warranting a 
different front page; rather, the aim of recent Russian government activity 
apparently is to halt the publication of hot news stories. 
 
Last month's hostage-taking crisis in Moscow created just the right climate for a 
further clampdown on Russian journalists. The authorities wasted no time 
rushing through amendments to the Law on the Mass Media. Prosecutor-general 
Vladimir Ustinov lobbed the first volley in the renewed fight to curb the press 
while the hostages were still in the "Nord-Ost" cultural center. On 23 October, 
Ustinov warned the State Duma that the government wasn't doing enough to 
counter extremism, then linked increases in extremist activity to inattentiveness 
on the part of the justice and press ministries. (ITAR-TASS, 0919 GMT, 23 Oct 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1023, via World News Connection) 
 
The Duma was quick to grasp the connection, and members passed 
amendments to the Law on Mass Media meant to stop the spread of ideas linked 
to extremism or terrorism. While some of the law's provisions are entirely 
understandable - such as a ban on disseminating instructions for making 
weapons or explosives, on counter-terrorism tactics or personal information 
about special services staff members without their authorization - other elements 
of the legislation are not so palatable. Specifically, the media are banned from 
disseminating information that serves to justify extremist activities, comments 
from persons hampering counter-terrorist operations, or propaganda concerning 
the resistance to counter-terrorist activities. (INTERFAX, 0851 GMT, 1 Nov 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1101, via World News Connection) 
 
Not surprisingly, given the Putin administration's propensity to view as dangerous 
anything in print that casts shadows on the Kremlin (can anyone say "Nikitin" or 
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"Pasko"?), legislation that officially suppresses the expression of dissent sent 
shudders of dismay through journalists and members of the international 
community. Those shudders were enough to unite left and right factions, as the 
sizable opposition vote on the third reading (231 in favor, 106 opposed) 
indicated. During the debates, Communist Party Deputy Alexander Kravets 
warned that such legislation would give the Kremlin "an instrument to cut off the 
oxygen both to federal and regional media outlets." Members of the Union of 
Right Forces (SPS) agreed. When the law is promulgated, Andrei Vulf of SPS 
said, "it will give legal groundwork for the state's monopoly for providing coverage 
and the assessment of all events, particularly those related to the Chechen 
problem. This would effectively introduce censorship of coverage of antiterrorism 
operations." (INTERFAX, 1410 GMT, 31 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1031, via 
World News Connection)  
 
Following passage of the law, the draft was sent to the Federation Council, which 
passed the bill (145 for, 1 against, with 2 abstentions) on 13 November. A level of 
legislator cynicism was hard to ignore. MP Nikolai Kondratenko, the former 
governor of the Krasnodar region, said that "there has been no free press in 
Russia for a long time, and all journalists work only for money, and therefore the 
bill should be approved." (INTERFAX, 1022 GMT, 13 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
1113, via World News Connection) Restrictions could be in place by the end of 
November. Interestingly, a carefully worded poll was taken to gauge popular 
support for the measure. When queried whether media coverage of situations 
involving hostage taking should be censored, a clear reference to the Moscow 
incident, 61 percent of persons responding said yes. (INTERFAX, 1417 GMT, 14 
Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1114, via World News Connection) However, there is 
no indication that poll participants were asked about other instances of media 
censorship, which the amendments would allow. 
 
Proving that paranoia really doesn't mean that no one is after you, Andrei 
Soldatov, editor of Versiya, said that security officers searched his newspaper 
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offices shortly after the new restrictions of the media were adopted. Soldatov 
claimed that the search was linked to a forthcoming article on the security 
services' rescue operation, which resulted in the deaths of many hostages due to 
the gas used to disable the hostage takers. [Versiya's reporting alleged that the 
FSB failed to act on warnings about an attack in Moscow from the Foreign 
Intelligence Service (SVR).] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) representative, Freimut Duve, made the same connection. "This 
attack against an independent media outlet is especially ominous since it 
happened 24 hours after the Russian Parliament adopted a number of highly 
restrictive provisions to the Law on Media," he said. Such activity "raises very 
serious concerns regarding Russia's commitment to freedom of expression," he 
added. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 1408 GMT, 3 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
1103, via World News Connection) 
 
Indeed, the only media representatives taking the new legislation in stride are the 
owners, not the journalists. And even much of that reaction is, at best, 
disingenuous, and at worst, downright naïve. The Industrial Committee, 
comprised of owners and senior managers of media outlets, announced its 
support of the Federation Council's passage of the law. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 14 
Nov 02) Other representatives, however, tried to view a bad situation in the best 
possible light. The National TV and Radio Association's president, Eduard 
Sagalaev, said his group "understands the decision of the State Duma" to pass 
the legislation in the third reading, since the law would "encourage the media to 
define its own self-limits" and create a code of corporate rules under which media 
companies and journalists would operate. (ITAR-TASS, 1827 GMT, 1 Nov 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1101, via World News Connection) Yet even that "out" would 
not be acceptable to Press Minister Mikhail Lesin, who explained that the 
legislation would overrule any code of conduct developed by the press. "When 
the citizens' security is under threat, uniform rules must be observed. It does not 
matter what kind of contract a journalist may have signed with the editor," Lesin 
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told a roundtable conference in crisis journalism on 5 November. (INTERFAX, 
1624 GMT, 5 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1105, via World News Connection) 
 
Meanwhile, Boris Berezovsky, no stranger to government prosecution, is ready to 
provide aid and comfort to the beleaguered. His Civil Liberties Foundation 
announced it will provide free legal aid to any journalist who is brought to trial 
under the new law. (WWW.NEWSRU.COM, 13 Nov 02; via RFE/RL Newsline) 
 
Clearly, the main target of this legislation is reportage of the war in Chechnya, 
given the administration's announcement of plans to intensify its activities there. 
Any coverage of the Chechen side of the conflict now can be painted with the 
"justification of extremism" brush, and punished accordingly. But dissent in 
Russia is not limited to the conflict in that breakaway region, and the precedents 
this legislation will allow could have ramifications throughout society. Putin's 
claim that his was a dictatorship of laws is getting closer and closer to reality, in 
full view of the international community. While the OSCE has come out against 
the new legislation, its protest has few teeth unless other Western voices are 
raised - an unlikely scenario, to be sure, given the international "war on 
terrorism." 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
Moscow's military response to terrorism comes too late 
On 21 October, Russian Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov announced that in the 
summer of 2003 the MVD would take control of the antiterrorism operation in 
Chechnya from the Federal Security Service (FSB). (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 22 Oct 
02) The Moscow hostage drama, two days later, changed everything. Since the 
crisis, a fundamental shift in military strategy has been evident, a shift from 
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accepting the status quo of Chechnya as a "low-grade fever" to attempting to 
achieve victory and closure (a victory that most believe to be out of reach). 
 
Two days after FSB forces stormed the Moscow theater, President Putin 
announced that: "Russia is now paying the price for the weakness of the state 
and the consequences of its inaction, but the country will make no 
'understandings' with terrorists or surrender to their blackmail. We will use the 
army more actively to combat international terrorism. The new objective for the 
Russian Armed Forces is to fight terrorism at the global level." (NOVAYA 
GAZETA, 4 Nov 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) At a subsequent Kremlin meeting with Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov, Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, 
Federal Security Service Director Patrushev and Interior Minister Gryzlov, Putin 
ordered a total revision of the country's National Security Doctrine that will 
increase the role of the military against terrorists and those who sponsor or 
finance them. As part of the reform, the interior ministry's 20 divisions of troops 
will be transformed over the next few years into a national guard. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 30 Oct 02) Additionally, the government's Financial Monitoring 
Committee will begin investigating financial operations that are allegedly 
supporting terrorism; allegedly the committee already has found links between 
the Chechen fighters who took the 800 hostages and foreign countries, including 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 5 Nov 02) 
 
These extraordinary steps speak to the level of discomfort the hostage event has 
brought to Putin as well as his desire to bring some closure. To that end he has 
cancelled the proposed transfer of responsibility for the Chechen war next 
summer from the FSB to the MVD. Additionally, he has halted all troop 
withdrawals from the republic and announced a new offensive. Speaking to 
journalists in Khabarovsk on 3 November, Defense Minister Ivanov said that 
Russian troops have begun "large-scale and tough but precisely targeted 
operations in all areas of Chechnya." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 4 Nov 02) 
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There are many reasons for concern over these developments. First, the 
massive military clampdown and "mopping-up" operations that this hostage 
situation initiated constitute just "more of the same." This strategy has been 
ineffective for the last three years and will continue to be a failure. If Moscow 
wants its war on terrorism to change, then Russia needs to invest in reform of the 
military to accomplish such a task. Such reform takes years to organize, train and 
equip military personnel to act differently than they have for the last 50 years. 
They can't just shape a new doctrine that resembles US concepts for fighting 
terrorism and have it be effective overnight. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 4 Nov 02; 
WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) It will also take 
lots of money, which Putin doesn't have. This reality is compounded by the fact 
that his forces are already in such poor shape. Currently the government still 
owes former servicemen of the 58th Army alone 20.3 billion rubles for the first 
and second campaigns in Chechnya. The payment of this past debt was not 
funded in the 2003 budget, forcing military personnel to file lawsuits as the only 
hope to get paid (a great reproach to the government). (NOVAYA GAZETA, 4 
Nov 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Second, only Chechen civilians are hurt when the estimated 80,000 troops in and 
around the separatist North Caucasus republic go on rampages to rout out 
terrorists. The pro-Moscow Chechen Security Council chief, Rudnik Dudaev, has 
protested against the mopping-up operations, saying that the military was flouting 
new rules governing the security sweeps that were supposed to avoid human 
rights abuses. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 4 Nov 02; WPS Defense and 
Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Such fears concerning human 
rights seem plausible given the history of Russian activity in the area and the 
conditions the military have on the ground. One Russian Army sergeant said: 
"[E]very time we arrest a suspect, local officials come protesting and Chechen 
women stage a rally. This is a real war for us, with explosions and battles every 
day. But we can do nothing-officially we have only civilians around." (AGENCE-
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FRANCE PRESSE, 29 Oct 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Another concern addresses the fact that this new doctrine gives the military 
internal "police" powers. One group of influential figures in the armed forces, 
especially in the General Staff, advocates broader powers for the military in the 
war against "enemies within." The military even has drafted legislation for a 
constitutional provision stating that all security structures, including the military, 
are to be used in response to internal threats. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 30 Oct 
02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The latest 
hostage event, and Putin's shift in military strategy, open a door of opportunity for 
hard-liners to capture enormous powers for the military, setting a dangerous 
precedent that could ultimately threaten Putin and the government. 
 
Regardless of these concerns, it would be wise for Moscow to step back from 
this situation and reflect on the root cause of its problems. First, at the root of the 
Chechnya dynamic are unresolved ethnic and national issues. These problems 
have grown with the use of military force which, applied conventionally, has 
precipitated much of the terrorist activity against Moscow. Chechnya's President 
Aslan Maskhadov explained: "We have nothing to lose by teaming up with hard-
line separatists. This war has radicalized us all regarding Russia. I am certain 
that in the final stage, we will carry out an even more exceptional operation, in 
the style of jihad, through which we will liberate our land from the Russian 
aggressors." (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 1713 GMT, 30 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1030, via World News Connection)  
 
Wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan provide historical examples of the military 
failing to deal with situations rooted in ethnic and national struggles. The military 
solution will only exacerbate the problem until Putin attacks the root causes of 
conflict in the region; however, many analysts see that as unlikely since 
Chechnya has been a convenient vehicle to foster Russian nationalist sentiments 
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and to win elections. (SIYASAT, 26 Oct 02; FBIS-NES-2002-1031, via World 
News Connection) Still, the hostage crisis might have changed Putin's view and 
precipitated these fundamental changes in military strategy. 
 
'Mission creep' into Georgia? 
Of additional concern is Moscow's desire to increase its influence and access in 
Georgia. Over the past few months Moscow has taken every opportunity to build 
up the case that Georgia is harboring terrorists and that Russia would use force 
to deal with the situation. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 11 Sep 02) Could the increase 
in military forces in Chechnya and the recent doctrinal and organizational 
changes be used as a springboard towards future military action in Georgia? The 
answer lies in the grim reality of Russian military capability both in Chechnya and 
in Georgia. 
 
The troops in the region are seriously worn out by the war in the Caucasus. 
Moreover, the reserves of the General Staff have dwindled so much that 
detachments are being sent to the region that lack a stable structure to fight 
guerrillas. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 2 Nov 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Additionally, morale is low, discipline is 
nonexistent, and frustration with the status quo is high. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 
25 Sep 02) Russian armed forces garrisoned in Georgia constitute mostly a 
symbolic presence. While their presence does provide some advantage, that 
alone does not mean they have the ability to join any coordinated offensive 
operation. They are severely limited due to a lack of supplies, equipment and 
morale. Additionally, they face opposition from their "host country." Georgian 
Defense Minister Lieutenant General David Tevzadze told journalists in Tbilisi 
that Georgia would restrict the movement of Russian forces within the country 
and limit the amount of supplies they bring in to expedite the closure of the two 
remaining Russian military bases on its territory. He cited the negative effect 
Russian bases have on Georgia's aspiration to join NATO. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
31 Oct 02) Also, after Russia threatened preemptive strikes on Georgia, the 
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Georgian parliament voted to increase defense spending by an additional $5 
million. (WWW.CIVIL.GE, 31 Oct 02) 
 
The risk of Putin using his military to strong-arm Georgia is low. Unlike 
Chechnya, there is too much Western media visibility in Georgia to keep any 
military operation quiet, and the international outcry would be significant. More 
importantly, Moscow understands it doesn't have the military capability or 
horsepower to wage a war on terrorism in Chechnya while simultaneously 
attacking Georgia. 
 
Putin can announce all the change he wants, but until he can reform his military 
into one that is properly funded, organized, trained and equipped, he will never 
win his war or influence regions of the world as he would hope. 
 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Russia: Armorer of NATO? 
Over the last several months Russian leaders have either criticized NATO 
enlargement or declared it a non-issue. While this may be an ambiguous policy, 
one thing is certain: The Russian defense industry hopes to capitalize on 
increased defense spending by NATO's newest members.  
 
Long a supplier to many of the world's more questionable governments (the 
rogue states or more recently the "axis of evil"), Russia now finds itself being 
squeezed in its traditional arms market by the United States. Reestablishing 
and/or expanding cooperation and military sales with many previously 
embargoed countries for much-needed access has become a necessity for the 
United States in the war on terrorism. Of particular note are the current or 
previous customers of Russia's weapons export business, including Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Tajikistan and Yugoslavia. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 11 Jan 02; What the 
Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Securities Database) 
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Of course, with sales to China and India, Russia still has a considerable export 
business. China's recent arms imports from Russia alone average well over $1 
billion per year and, along with sales to India, make up over 60% of Russian 
weapons exports. (For a more detailed look at Russia's arms export to China and 
India, see THE NIS OBSERVED, 16 Oct 02.) Yet problems exist. First, Russia 
itself cannot afford to purchase the products of its military manufacturers, thus 
forcing almost complete reliance on exports. And Russia's dependence on India 
and China is substantial. Indeed, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
recently said that "the Russian defense sector can only be preserved by 
supplying military hardware to China." Another indication of the problem may be 
President Putin's decision effectively to disband the monopoly held by 
Rosoboronexport, Russia's principal arms exporter. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 31 
Oct 02) This action may constitute an attempt to invigorate Russia's defense 
industry. (KOMMERSANT, 6 Nov 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Securities Database) 
 
The need to expand its customer base has led (or forced) Russia to pursue new 
markets, particularly those being created by NATO enlargement. The most 
obvious are countries that still possess Soviet-era military equipment and are 
looking to upgrade their armed forces. As Andrei Beliyaninov, managing director 
of Rosoboronexport, explained, "80-90 percent of the arsenal in eastern and 
central Europe is Soviet. It has to be supported and maintained." New contracts 
signed by Poland and Hungary support Beliyaninov's statement. However, even 
in announcing this success he concedes that there is a problem in "the absence 
of sufficient domestic purchases" by Russia's own armed forces. (THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), 1 Nov 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Greece is top customer 
Surprisingly, one of Russia's primary advocates for arms sales to NATO is not a 
former satellite of the Soviet Union. Greece, the top NATO purchaser of Russian 
military hardware, has made clear its support for Russian participation in 
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European defense. Russia and Greece have had a military and technical 
cooperation agreement since 1995 when Greece became the first NATO 
member to start making large purchases of Russian military equipment. 
(ROSOBORONEXPORT PRESS SERVICE, 1 Oct 02; PR Newswire European, 
via Lexis-Nexis) Recent arms sales between the two countries are valued at over 
$1 billion, and Greece has promised even greater cooperation in both arms 
production and sales. "We will support development of relations between 
Russian and the EU, including arms," Greek Defense Minister Yiannos 
Papandoniou said. Papandoniou's statement is especially significant since 
Greece is about to head the EU, beginning in January. (IZVESTIA, 5 Apr 02; 
What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Securities Database) 
 
The blossoming military cooperation between Greece and Russia was on full 
display last month in Athens at the Defendory International 2002 Arms Expo. The 
Russian manufacturers were considered to be the main attractions at the Expo, 
which was organized by the Greek defense ministry. There has been a steady 
demand by the Greeks for Russian arms as they update and reform their military, 
especially air defense weapons, ships (particularly amphibious and hydrofoils) 
and anti-tank systems. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 3 Oct 02; What the Papers 
Say, via ISI Defense and Securities Database) 
 
One of the more recent goals of Russia's defense industry has been to join in 
production of military weapons with European defense industry. (EPENDHITIS, 
19 Oct 02; FBIS-EEU-2002-1020, via World News Connection) The benefits here 
are obvious. The Russians not only would gain access to Western technology 
and weapon design but also would become a "legitimate" brand name within the 
European and other Western markets. Strong Greek (and EU) advocacy is a step 
toward achieving that goal. 
 
Modernizing NATO's newest members 
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With Greece as a solid customer, the Russian focus is now directly on countries 
previously part of the Soviet sphere. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
all new members of NATO, must now comply with alliance standards on 
weapons compatibility and defense spending. Each of these countries possesses 
large stockpiles of Soviet-era arms and equipment and NATO recognizes that 
complete replacement would be extremely costly. Modernization of the existing 
weapons is obviously the more economical choice and is supported by NATO. In 
fact, updating the military weapons and equipment of these nations is well 
underway and the Russian defense industry is one of the primary suppliers. 
(INTERFAX, 21 Sept 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The most publicized example involves the Russian-produced MiG-29 fighter 
aircraft. Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and, most recently, Poland have 
signed multi-year contracts with a Russian-German consortium for modernization 
of the MiG-29. The consortium includes the aircraft's Russian manufacturer 
Mikoyan. Poland alone has 22 of the aircraft and expects to receive another 23 
from Germany that were inherited through reunification. At present only 10 are 
airworthy. The Russian hope is that these initial contracts will lead the countries 
eventually to consider new MiGs as replacements for the older MiGs instead of 
US- or European-produced fighters. (NEZAVISIMOE VOENNOE OBOZRENIE, 4 
Oct 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Securities Database) 
 
The big question is how long Russia will be able to maintain such contracts as 
these countries gradually shift to a new generation of military equipment. Greece 
aside, none of these countries has made acquisition of new Russian-made 
weapons a defense priority. Already Hungary has signed a contract to lease 14 
Swedish-made Gripen aircraft beginning in 2005. (MOSCOW NEWS, 2 Oct 02; 
via Lexis-Nexis) The US and France are also competing to gain sales and have 
made substantial loans the centerpiece of a proposed sale of fighter aircraft to 
Poland. The size of the loans ($3-4 billion) will be difficult, if not impossible, for 
Russia to match. For new members of NATO, and in many cases EU aspirants, 
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the unspoken desire is certainly to acquire the technologically more advanced 
products of European countries and the United States. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
Getting personal 
While Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma continues to be politically isolated by 
the West, the question arises as to the effects this has on Ukraine itself, its 
political relations and their future developments. 
 
As the November NATO summit in Prague approached, the alliance spokesman, 
Yves Brodeur, officially stated that Kuchma would not be welcome at the 
meeting, although he could not be stopped from attending as head of the 
Ukrainian delegation. (ITAR-TASS, 16 Nov 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) The Ukraine-NATO commission session scheduled to take 
place during the summit was demoted to a foreign minister-level meeting - a 
move generally understood to be aimed at the exclusion of President Kuchma. 
While the snub was directed at the president and not Ukraine itself, it is evident 
that continued strained relations between the country's leader and the West are 
bound also to have negative effects on Ukrainian relations with the West. One 
ought to consider the danger that such strained relations could carry over into a 
post-Kuchma Ukraine if they continue for too long. In this contact, the European 
Union is also playing its part with lukewarm statements towards Ukraine. The 
problematic discussions on Ukraine's western border, a future EU border as 
Poland is approaching membership, are particularly prone to disenchant the 
Western Ukrainian oblasts, traditionally more pro-Western than the eastern 
portion of the country. 
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The danger of blurred lines between the international treatment of President 
Kuchma and of Ukraine becomes particularly pertinent in view of Kuchma's 
domestic position vis-à-vis an indecisive and divided opposition. The struggle 
over the last weeks to decide on a candidate for the post of prime minister has 
illustrated how the division among political forces plays into Kuchma's hands. 
Kuchma's dismissal of Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh and his Cabinet of 
Ministers on 16 November (UKRAINIAN NEWS AGENCY, 16 Nov 02; Ukrainian 
News Online, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) followed the failure of 
parliament to nominate a replacement candidate for the PM post. As Kuchma 
pushes his candidate, Donetsk Region Governor Viktor Yanukovych, the 
opposition four (as well as the other parliamentary factions) are undecided about 
their course both between and within their parties, making for weak opposition. 
This situation is beginning to ease a smooth path for Kuchma and his candidate, 
who might well turn out to be a welcome puppet and future presidential candidate 
in Kuchma's pocket (and could turn out to be a second Pavlo Lazarenko, who is 
currently standing trial in California). 
 
Kuchma (and with him Ukraine) undoubtedly is facing a large, multifaceted crisis 
at the moment. However, as the internal opposition front is undermined by its 
own failure to tread a common path for the time being and international pressure 
is weighing heavily on the country, one needs to ask whether Kuchma is not in a 
position to escape less damaged from the crisis than Ukraine itself - and which 
way Ukraine's international policies would turn in such an scenario. 
 
President Kuchma in fact will be attending the NATO summit. He was listed as 
head of the Ukrainian delegation in the last participants' list sent to Prague on 17 
November. (UNIAN, 17 Nov 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) The Ukraine-NATO commission continues to be held at the foreign 
minister-level, with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko attending. According to the 
National Security and Defense Council, Kuchma will participate in the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council meeting, (NOVY KANAL TV, 16 Nov 02; BBC 
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Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) despite NATO spokesman 
Brodeur's statement that he has not been invited. (ITAR-TASS, 16 Nov 02; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
BELARUS 
A question of ethics  
Joining Kuchma on the list of undesirable attendees in Prague is Belarus 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, also known as "Europe's last dictator." As a 
member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, Belarus is also a NATO partner and so 
could not have been disinvited from the summit. In Lukashenka's case, however, 
the Czech authorities turned to a highly unusual means of preventing the 
unwelcome president from attending: denying him a visa to enter the country.  
 
Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Cyril Svoboda stated on 7 November that "we 
believe that it is necessary to show certain solidarity with those who fight for 
human rights and democracy. That is, it is possible not to issue a visa even to a 
head of state." He went on to state that "it is beyond doubt that Lukashenka's 
regime tramples human rights underfoot." (PRAVO, 7 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
1107, via World News Connection) 
 
While expressing indignation at this state of affairs and asserting that it is up to 
the EU and NATO to be working towards cooperation with Belarus, (INTERFAX, 
11 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1111, via World News Connection) Lukashenka and 
his regime have continued to reconfirm their poor human rights record. Belarus 
ranked an abysmal 124th (out of 139 countries) in the worldwide index of 
countries according to their respect for press freedom published by French media 
watchdog Reporters Without Borders. (WWW.RSF.ORG) Despite concern voiced 
by Freedom House, (RFE/RL MEDIA MATTERS, 25 Oct 02) Lukashenka also 
signed the contested amendment to the Freedom of Religious Confessions and 
Religious Organizations Law on 31 October. (INTERFAX, 31 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1031, via World News Connection) 
 23 
 
The Czech visa discussions are only adding to the problems of Belarus 
international relations. Relations with the West are undermined not only by the 
regime's human rights record, but (among other issues) also by its continued 
flirtations with Baghdad. Further, on 29 October the last member of the OSCE 
mission left Minsk, (INTERFAX, 29 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1029, via World 
News Connection) although since then the OSCE and Belarus have made some 
attempts at rapprochement with the encouragement of the EU. In the face of 
European Union backing for Prague's position, however, Lukashenka made the 
future of OSCE talks dependent on the outcome of his visa application. 
(INTERFAX, 14 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1114, via World News Connection) 
 
Russian authorities have come out in support of Belarus. Federation Council 
Speaker Sergei Mironov said that Czech actions concerning Lukashenka's visa 
have been incorrect, adding that "it's not about Lukashenka, it's about observing 
the ethical norms of international relations." (INTERFAX, 14 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1114, via World News Connection) On the Czech side, Svoboda stated that 
"certain values must be complied with, foreign policy cannot be purely 
pragmatic." (PRAVO, 7 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1107, via World News 
Connection) How does one, then, weigh up the ethical norms of international 
relations and the ethical norms of human rights, and where is the line to be 
drawn? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
What changes will the new pipeline bring? 
Important developments in Azerbaijan have been sidelined in recent months by 
more dramatic events in Moscow and Georgia. In the meantime, Azerbaijan has 
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begun construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and signed an agreement 
with Russia to define national sectors of the Caspian Sea.  
 
The groundbreaking ceremony took place near Baku on 18 September, attended 
by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The international 
consortium is led by British Petroleum and includes Norway's Statoil, Unocal of 
the US and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The 1,760km Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is scheduled to be finished by the beginning of 
2005, in time for some 450,000 barrels per day to flow from the consortium's 
main Azerbaijani offshore fields, Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 17 
Sep 02)  
 
The construction was delayed for several years because it was not clear whether 
these fields would yield enough oil to make the project worthwhile. It is projected 
that in addition to the Azeri oil, some of Kazakhstan's Caspian oil will be directed 
along this route. Conoco Philips, which owns a portion of Kazakhstan's enormous 
Kashagan field, bought a 2.5% stake in the BTC pipeline. Three other members 
of the Azerbaijani consortium (Inpex, Total, ENI Agip) also own stakes in the 
Kashagan field. (AFX EUROPEAN FOCUS, 30 Oct 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Russia, which had opposed the pipeline, made one last effort to prevent its 
construction. The Russian pipeline monopoly Transneft offered lower prices in an 
attempt to outbid the BTC project. But it became clear that the companies were 
determined to go ahead. On 23 September, Azeri President Geydar Aliev met 
with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow where they signed an agreement 
demarcating their respective segments of the seabed. Moscow had signed a 
similar agreement with Kazakhstan several months earlier. (ORT, 23 Sep 02; via 
Lexis-Nexis) On 24 September, Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev visited Baku 
and told the Azeri parliament that the Duma was ready to ratify the agreement. 
(SPACE TV, 24 Sep 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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The oil routes currently functioning terminate in Russia's port, Novorosiisk, and in 
Supsa, Georgia. In the first 10 months of 2002, SOCAR exported 2.257 million 
tons of oil through the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline. It has persuaded Russia to 
maintain similar levels in the future. (RIA OREANDA, 5 Nov 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
SOCAR also has committed to use of the Supsa line through 2005. According to 
Azeri spokesmen, that pipeline will remain in demand by companies exploiting 
Azerbaijan's onshore deposits even after BTC comes online. (TURAN, 24 Sep 
02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Azerbaijan also has made provisions to use its oil profits responsibly. The State 
Oil Fund was formed in 1999 at the behest of the World Bank and the IMF and is 
supposed to direct oil revenue to social spending. This year the oil fund is 
expected to spend $45 million (out of $100 million non-oil related spending) to 
improve living conditions for refugees. Over 200,000 ethnic Azeris became 
refugees when Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war over the Nagorno-Karabakh 
region, a part of Azerbaijan that is now overwhelmingly Armenian. Other uses of 
the fund include infrastructure and communications development. (TURAN, 4 
Nov 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
Many analysts have pointed out that the pipeline will alter political alignments in 
the region -- binding the Caspian states closer to Turkey and Europe, and freeing 
them from dependency on Russia and Transneft. Certainly in the long term the 
BTC pipeline will promote Azerbaijan's financial and political independence. 
However, the pipeline cannot address the two fundamental political challenges 
facing Azerbaijan at present - ensuring a democratic transition of power after the 
death or retirement of the current president and peacefully regaining control at 
least of some of the districts of Azerbaijan now occupied by Armenia.  
 
Aliev's picked successor- his son Ilham - visited Washington on 22 October. 
Ilham Aliev met with Vice President Richard Cheney, Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage and other influential personalities and made a presentation at 
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Johns Hopkins University in which he emphasized the benefits of the BTC 
pipeline and complained about the continued Armenian occupation of Azeri 
territory. (For a transcript, see www.cacianalyst.org/)  
 
Aliev's visit attracted less attention than a new lawsuit opened in New York by 
Czech businessman Viktor Kozeny, who is accusing Aliev senior and junior of 
fraud and claiming $100 million in damages. (CTK BUSINESS NEWS WIRE, 3 
Nov 02; via Lexis-Nexis) Kozeny, who has a shady reputation, [EVENING 
STANDARD (London), 23 Oct 02] became rich and famous after manipulating 
the Czech voucher privatization process. But when he tried the same approach in 
Azerbaijan, he met his match. Kozeny invited Western businessmen to buy into 
the Azerbaijan privatization process on the expectation that Azerbaijan's 
company, SOCAR, would be privatized. When the Azeris decided not to privatize 
SOCAR, the shareholders were left with worthless stock in Azerbaijan's carpet 
factories. Western firms sued Kozeny, who in turn sued the Azeri government. 
Previous lawsuits filed in the Bahamas and London failed to persuade the courts 
that the Azeris had ever promised Kozeny that they would privatize SOCAR. 
 
The US, which has criticized the present government repeatedly for corruption 
and for repression of opposition parties and popular protests, is much more likely 
to favor open democratic elections to decide who will rule Azerbaijan than to 
endorse a backroom deal. The US has some economic levers over Armenia but 
has always hesitated to use them to secure a resolution to the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute. Instead the US imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan that were 
only lifted last year.  
 
The Russians are much more likely to look favorably on a less-than-democratic 
transfer of power and they provide the lion's share of Armenia's weapons and 
supplies. Over the last two years, Aliev's close relations with Putin have been 
premised on the expectation that Russia will use its influence with Armenia in 
Azerbaijan's favor. Although a Russian-sponsored peace accord is unlikely, the 
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recent promises to close down the Nagorno-Karabakh representation in Moscow 
has given the Azeris some hope. (RFE/RL AZERBAIJAN REPORT, 1 Nov 02) 
 
Over the last decade, Russian politicians have thrown up many roadblocks in the 
path of Caspian oil development. They are cooperating now because for the 
foreseeable future Azerbaijan will continue to rely heavily on Russia to overcome 
its most significant political dilemmas. In the long term, however, the pipeline will 
give the Azeris more options. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Oil, economics and the status quo  
By far the most significant economic exports of Central Asia are oil and gas. At 
the center of the business negotiations of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, and alongside the post-11 September 2001 allied military presence 
in Central Asia, these exports have been a primary focus of Western policy in the 
region. While fossil fuels remain the backbone of the generalized economic 
picture of Central Asia, though, the wealth culled from these natural resources 
often is not widely distributed; thus other economies gain importance, especially 
for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Discussion of developing the economies and the 
economic culture of Central Asia, therefore, focuses on two main points: On the 
one hand, there is a status quo failure to diversify production; on the other hand, 
there is openness to expanded economic cooperation and creative means to 
deal with debt. 
 
Oil and gas 
In efforts to increase their prominence as international oil exporters, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan both are positioning their markets to meet fossil fuel energy 
needs. The Russian charge d'affaires, Andrei Molochkov, recently met with 
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Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov to discuss facilitating the export of 
natural gas. According to Molochkov, "Russia would buy 10 billion cubic meters 
of Turkmen gas a year starting from 2005, and the amount would be enlarged to 
20 billion from 2008." (INTERFAX, 1248 GMT, 4 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1104, 
via World News Connection)  
 
In late October, Turkmenneftegaz, the state company which will supply the gas to 
Russia, announced that the price for next year's export of gas would be $44 USD 
per cubic meter ($2 US above this year's price) and that the terms would be 50 
percent goods and 50 percent hard currency. (ITAR-TASS, 0840 GMT, 27 Oct 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1027, via World News Connection) This comes at the same 
time as Turkmenistan's announcement that the proposed trans-Afghanistan 
pipeline has been postponed indefinitely and that Turkmenistan is willing to begin 
production at new gas fields should the international market indicate a need to do 
so. (ITAR-TASS, 1417 GMT, 26 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1026, and INTERFAX, 
1033 GMT, 28 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1028, via World News Connection) 
 
Last Spring, the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a long-term 
contract to increase the transit of Kazakh oil through Russia (from 17 million tons 
a year to 25 million tons). In early November, the director-general of KazTransOil 
company announced plans to reconstruct the Atyrau-Samara pipeline (from 
western Kazakhstan to Russia) in efforts to meet the terms of the contract. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0721 GMT, 6 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1106, via World News 
Connection) 
 
From a Western view, the increased development of these energy markets 
implies an alternative to reliance on Middle Eastern oil. The US is the leading 
investor in Kazakhstan, with 2002 investments expected to exceed $6 billion 
USD. The largest portion of this investment is in the energy sector. 
(KAZAKHSTAN TODAY, 14 Nov 02; ISI Emerging Markets Database) The deep 
investment of foreign oil companies, however, has not been entirely welcome. 
 29 
According to Sergei Smirnov, a senior research fellow at the Kazakh Institute of 
Strategic Studies, "the state has practically lost control over the largest and most 
promising oil and gas fields." Smirnov further claims that "75 percent of 
geological reserves of oil and 79 percent of gas reserves are controlled by 
foreign capital." (EURASIANET, 13 Nov 02; via www.eurasianet.org)  
 
Other markets 
Oil and gas, of course, are only part of the Central Asian economic picture. 
Kyrgyzstan is preparing to export electricity to Siberia as well as to provide tin 
and tungsten through the development of the Sary-Dzhaz deposit. (INTERFAX, 
1341 GMT, 5 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1105, and ITAR-TASS, 0933 GMT, 5 Nov 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1102, via World News Connection) Kyrgyzstan relies largely 
on the extraction of its natural resources and this reveals an economic 
vulnerability. The Kumtor gold mine, for example, accounts for 38 percent of the 
country's industrial output and a third of its exports. (KABAR, 6 Nov 02; via 
www.times.kg) This exposes the lopsided nature of the economy and the threat 
which a fall in gold prices poses to the stability of the country's markets. 
 
These shortcomings can be seen in other countries as well. The proclaimed 
"failure" of the cotton crop in Turkmenistan, (ITAR-TASS, 1317 GMT, 5 Nov 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1105, via World News Connection) for example, resulted in 
greater emphasis being placed on the extraction of natural resources than on 
diversification of production. Yet another aspect of this failure to diversify is 
reflected by the presence of "guest workers" who seek employment outside their 
home country. Russia is a popular destination for these "guest workers" as 
individuals leave cities such as Andijan and Ferghana, Uzbekistan, to work for 
indefinite periods in cities such as Novosibirsk and Tomsk, where they can make 
more than nine times the local Uzbek wages. (EURASIANET, 3 Oct 02; via 
www.eurasianet.org) 
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Recognizing the need to increase jobs and opportunities, Central Asian countries 
are increasingly proactive in attracting foreign investors. Kyrgyz President Askar 
Akaev has encouraged France to increase direct private investments, while 
Tajikistan recently hosted a trade fair with Iran to indicate expanded economic 
cooperation between the two countries. (ITAR-TASS, 2033 GMT, 5 Nov 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1105, and IRNA, 1449 GMT, 30 Oct 02; FBIS-NES-2002-1030, 
via World News Connection) And while the Uzbek government recently set up a 
special section within the Cabinet to handle foreign economic relations, 
(INTERFAX, 1329 GMT, 5 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1105, via World News 
Connection) Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev went one step farther by 
encouraging the OSCE to create a regional strategy for developing economics, 
democracy and the environment. Commenting on this need, Nazarbaev said, 
"We have never had a democratic set-up or a market economy before. 
Therefore, we categorically reject recommendations on how to accelerate 
democratic reforms artificially." (INTERFAX, 1310 GMT, 6 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1106, via World News Connection) 
 
Nazarbaev's statement emphasizes the need of pragmatism in reform. The World 
Bank has taken a step toward encouraging such reforms by giving financial 
incentives for change. The World Bank Environmental Department is discussing 
writing off debt of some developing countries, including Kyrgyzstan, in exchange 
for increased attempts to conserve natural resources and protect the 
environment. (INTERFAX, 1415 GMT, 1 Nov 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1101, via 
World News Connection) Most often, however, Central Asian countries are not 
given real incentives for implementing economic reforms because donor 
governments are lax in tying aid to economic improvements. (EURASIANET, 11 
Sep 02; via www.eurasianet.org) Without such incentives, the governments of 
Central Asia remain less inclined to alter the status quo, opting instead to focus 
their energies on a few key sectors that are particularly vulnerable to the 
demands of the world community. 
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Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
'Freedom fighters or terrorists' debate continues 
The recent hostage crisis in Russia has sent political repercussions rippling 
through the three Baltic states. Due to their strong support for the right of self-
determination, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania long have been de facto supporters 
of the Chechen independence movement; however, Baltic support for Chechnya 
is coming under scrutiny from domestic forces as the debate of freedom fighter 
versus terrorist continues within the international system. 
 
The Vilnius-based Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Information and Culture Mission 
has become the focus of a domestic political struggle between Lithuanian 
politicians. The political debate surrounding the breakaway republic and the 
proper level of Lithuanian support began even before the Moscow hostage crisis. 
Igniting the debate was the desire of the Seimas opposition leader, Vytautas 
Landsbergis, to attend the World Chechen Congress in Denmark. Landsbergis 
was not encouraged by the Seimas to attend the congress, which formally 
disapproved his visit (citing Lithuania's lack of formal recognition of the Chechen 
republic). (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1550 GMT, 28 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
1028, via World News Connection)  
 
The parliament, already split by the Landsbergis debate, became more divided 
over the Chechen issue when the hostage crisis erupted. A special 
interparliamentary association between the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and the 
Seimas went through a series of public vettings. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 
1219 GMT, 31 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1031, via World News Connection) 
Some members decided to distance themselves from the association in protest 
against the hostage taking, while eight other parliament deputies actually 
requested membership in the association. The new recruits were drawn to the 
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organization by the immense attention devoted to the hostage drama. As Social 
Democrat Kestutis Krisciunas explained his decision to join, "I want to express 
my solidarity with the Chechen nation. Every nation has the right to self-
determination." But he was quick to add that "terrorist or military actions must not 
be taken to pursue this aim." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1219 GMT, 31 Oct 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1031, via World News Connection) 
 
The admission of eight new members to the interparliamentary association 
helped to support the opposition of Vilnius municipality representatives to 
Russian demands for the closure of the Chechen mission. Russia, using the 
hostage crisis as a pretext to infringe upon Lithuanian sovereignty, demanded on 
28 October that the Lithuanian government close the mission and disassociate 
itself from the Chechen organization, claiming that the mission serves only to 
facilitate Chechen activities within Lithuania. The presence of MPs in the 
association bolstered the city authorities' stand to keep the mission open. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 0807 GMT, 29 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1029, via 
World News Connection)  
 
In Latvia, response to the hostage situation in Moscow took the form of tighter 
borders, as the government stepped up operations along the Latvian and 
Lithuanian boundary. An earlier arrest of illegal immigrants from Chechnya had 
increased Latvian fears that a Lithuanian crackdown on illegal immigration might 
invoke a new round of large-scale illegal border crossings from the approximately 
100 Chechens who are detained in Lithuania. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 0657 
GMT, 25 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1025, via World News Connection)  
 
The hostage crisis made more visible the sharp ethnic divisions in the Estonian 
parliament, as deputies reacted to motions by pro-Russian political factions. In a 
letter addressed to Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland, three members of 
the United People's Party of Estonia - Viktor Andrejev, Jevgeni Tomberg, and 
Valentina Vossotskaja -- called for the closure of the Chechen Cultural Center in 
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Estonia due to the "international evaluation of recent events in Moscow and on 
the grounds of the UN Security Council's resolution No. 1373, which bans any 
kind of support for terrorists." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1242 GMT, 30 Oct 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1030, via World News Connection) The letter rapidly received a 
sharp rebuke from the chairman of the Reform Party, Jurgen Ligi, who stated that 
"the principles of freedom of speech and ethnic minorities' cultural autonomy are 
laid down in our Constitution. A democratic state cannot interfere in the activities 
of citizens or associations of citizens residing in the country on the basis of ethnic 
criteria alone." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 1653 GMT, 31 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1031, via World News Connection) 
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